State of Utah v. Cheriff Sarkis Mahi : Brief of Appellee by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2004
State of Utah v. Cheriff Sarkis Mahi : Brief of
Appellee
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Kenneth A. Bronston; Assistant Utah Attorney General; Mark L. Shurtleff; Attorney General;
Bradley J. Knell, Christopher G. Bown; Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney; Attorneys for Appellee.
Patrick V. Lindsay; Aldrich, Nelson, Weight and Esplin; Margaret P. Lindsay; Attorneys for
Appellant.
This Brief of Appellee is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellee, Utah v. Mahi, No. 20040080 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2004).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4780
IN'I'UK Vl\\\ 1 Ml'HI 'II- WW U S 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHERIFF SARKIS MAHI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040080-CA 




K F U 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE CKET NO. ^OD HOO^O-CA 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED BURGLAR \. 
FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-6-203 (WEST 1999), ROBBERY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301 (1999), AND 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (WEST1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONOR ART F T nFNNIS FRFPFRICK. PRFSTDING 
PATRICK V. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & 1-^ plhi 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84<: '895 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARKL. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6<h R 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84 i 14-t * ~ 4 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
BRADLEY J. KNELL 
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for AppellflBAH APpiri, A^ 
Fro o C 0 U R r S 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHERIFF SARKIS MAHI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040080-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
APPEAL FROM CONVICTIONS FOR AGGRAVATED BURGLARY, A 
FIRST DEGREE FELONY, IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 
76-6-203 (WEST 1999), ROBBERY, A SECOND DEGREE FELONY, 
IN VIOLATION OF UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301 (1999), AND 
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT, A THIRD DEGREE FELONY, UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (WEST1999), IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL 
DISTRICT COURT, IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, THE 
HONORABLE J. DENNIS FREDERICK, PRESIDING 
PATRICK V. LINDSAY 
Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin 
43 East 200 North 
P.O. Box "L" 
Provo, Utah 84603-0200 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON (4470) 
Assistant Utah Attorney General 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF (4666) 
Attorney General 
Heber M. Wells Building 
160 East 300 South, 6th Fl. 
PO BOX 140854 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114-0854 
Telephone: (801) 366-0180 
MARGARET P. LINDSAY 
99 East Center Street 
P.O. Box 1895 
Orem, Utah 84059-1895 
BRADLEY J. KNELL 
CHRISTOPHER G. BOWN 
Deputy Salt Lake District Attorney 
Attorneys for Appellant Attorneys for Appellee 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
TABLE OF CONTENTS i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES iii 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 1 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE 
REVIEW 2 
STATUTES 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 3 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 5 
POINT II 5 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S 120-DAY DISPOSITION REQUEST; BY NOT 
MOVING TO DISMISS THE ACTION, DEFENDANT FAILED TO TRIGGER 
THE COURT'S REVIEW; ANY ERROR WAS HARMLESS BECAUSE THE 
120-DAYS HAD NOT EXPIRED 6 
A. By failing to move to dismiss the case, defendant failed to 
trigger the trial court's duty to rule on the proceeding 7 
B. Defendant was tried within the 120-day disposition period; 
therefore, he was not entitled to a dismissal of the information 9 
i 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
GRANT A MISTRIAL BECAUSE EVIDENCE THAT DEFENDANT WAS 
INCARCERATED WAS INVITED BY DEFENDANT'S OPENING 
STATEMENT AND WAS NECESSARY TO DISPROVE DEFENSE'S 
THEORY 15 
A. The standard of review 15 
B. The factual background 16 
C. Testimony that defendant was incarcerated was proper because 
defendant invited the evidence from opening statement 18 
D. Evidence that defendant was incarcerated while awaiting trial is not 
prohibited by Rule 404(b) 21 
E. Even if lineup officers' testimony was improper, any error was 
harmless because evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming 22 
F. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel fails because his 
counsel's failure to request a curative jury instruction was conscious 
trial strategy 24 
CONCLUSION 26 
ADDENDA 
Addendum A - Statute 
Addendum B - 120-Day Disposition Request and Transcript of Proceedings 
Addendum C - Transcript of Defendant's Opening Statement, 
Motion for Mistrial, and Ruling 
ii 
I AIJI I .OF \i I'l'linitlTIKN 
FEDERAL CASES 
Stricklandv. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 104 S. Ct. 2052 ^ 1 ^ ., 24 
STATE CASES 
Cln , i Shik .M 'II , • "t.ili I'V'I 22 
State v. Banner, 717 P.2d 1325 (Utah 1(>8 15 
State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439 (Utah 1988; Jl 
State v Bowman. <>4- . 1 J 1 ^3 (Utah Ct. App. 199" ^ 20 
Stow !•.',,.'- r\ l:>, In 
State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, 34 P.id 790 2, I,', I I 
State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177 (Utah Ct. App.), 
cert, denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994) 24 
State v. Creviston, 646 P,2d 750 (Utah 1982) 10 
State v. DeCorso, 1909 11T 57, *>«H I'M !•!•',/ 
State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) ^ 
State v. Harmon. 956 P.2d 262 (Utah "• ™ON " ' ^ 
State v. Holbert, 2002 L1 V-r 126, 61 P.3d 291 
State v. Holgate, 2000 UT 74. i <» !'.3d 346 
State j-,,,insu • . • .1, 989) 
State y'•'',•. '• 
State v. Lindsay, 2000 L i ^ — ^Q, 18 P.3d 504 
iii 
State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, 12 P.3d 92 3 
State v. Medina, 738P.2d 1021 (Utah 1987) 20 
State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) 20 
State v.Petersen, 810P.2d421 (Utah 1991) 10 
State v. Ramos, 882 P.2d 149 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) 21 
State v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36 8 
State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219 (Utah L997), overruled in part on other grounds, 
State v. ^eefo,2002UT98,61P.3dl000 15, 16 
State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, 58 P.3d 879 22 
State v. Strain, 885 P.2d 810 (UtahCt. App. 1994) 24 
State v. Tennyson, 850P.2d461 (UtahCt. App. 1993) 24 
State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 299 (Utah 1998) 21 
State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546 (Utah 1987) 18, 19 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422 (Utah 1993) 19 
State v. Viles,702?.2d 1175 (Utah 1985) 10, 11 
State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960 (Utah 1989) 21 
State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, 61 P.3d 1000 16 
State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361,453 P.2d 158 (Utah 1969) 10 
State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447 (Utah 1987) 11 
Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 912 P.2d 457 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) 8 
STATE STATUTES 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (West 2004) 1 
iv 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-203 (West 2004) 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-301 (1999) . 1 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (West 200 • ^- sim 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3 (West 20C .. 1 
2004 Utah Laws, c. 112, § 1 1 
v 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Appellee, 
v. 
CHERIFF SARKIS MAHI, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 20040080-CA 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE 
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF THE PROCEEDINGS 
This is an appeal from convictions for aggravated burglary, a first degree felony, in 
violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-203 (West 2004); robbery, a second degree felony, 
in violation of UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-6-301 (1999); and aggravated assault, a third degree 
felony, UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-5-103 (West 2004), in the Third Judicial District Court, in 
and for Salt Lake County, the Honorable J. Dennis Frederick, presiding.1 This Court has 
jurisdiction pursuant to UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-2a-3(2)(j) (West 2004). 
1
 In 2004, section 76-5-30l(l)(a) was substantively amended. 2004 Utah Laws, c. 
112, § 1. Therefore, citation to the robbery statute is made to the relevant code at the time 
of the offense. Since the aggravated burglary and aggravated assault statutes have not 
been amended since the time of the offense, citation is made to the current code. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND 
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
1. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in not dismissing the charges pursuant 
to UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (West 2004) (Utah Speedy Trial Statute), where defendant 
failed to make a timely and specific motion? 
This Court reviews a trial court's determination under the speedy trial statute for abuse 
of discretion. State v. Coleman, 2001 UT App 281, ^3, 34 P.3d 790. 
2. Whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a 
mistrial based on testimony suggesting that defendant was incarcerated during a lineup? 
A trial court's denial of a motion for a mistrial is reviewed for abuse of discretion. 
State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, Tf 46, 27 P.3d 1133. 
STATUTES 
Defendant's appeal requires this Court to apply UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (West 
2004) (Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Defendant was charged by amended information with aggravated burglary (Count I), 
robbery (Count II), and aggravated assault (Count III) (R. 41-42). A jury found defendant 
guilty of all the charges (R. 128-30). The trial court sentenced defendant to statutory prison 
terms of five-years-to-life (aggravated burglary), one-to-fifteen years (robbery), and zero-to-
five years (aggravated assault), to run consecutively (R. 142-43). Defendant timely appealed 
(R. 145). The Utah Supreme Court transferred the case to this court (R. 159). 
2 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS2 
In the early morning of April 25,2002, defendant and Blaine Black (Black), wearing 
masks and claiming they were from the F.B.L, kicked in the door of Benito Gonzales-
Torres' s apartment at 564 East 600 South (R. 165:3 8-40,45). Initially, the lights were off and 
defendant was wearing a black mask; however, the burglars turned the lights on, and 
defendant raised the mask above his eyebrows when he attacked Gonzales and removed it 
before he left (R. 165:39, 41, 62). 
Defendant hit Gonzales in the face with a flashlight and then a lamp, then Black held 
Gonzales on the ground, rubbing his face in the carpet as defendant ransacked the apartment 
(R. 165:39-41,43,45). Gonzales nearly fainted from the attack, which left him with pain "all 
over [his] body" and marks on his face (R. 165:43-45; State's Ex. 2 & 3). Victor Gutierrez, 
Gonzales's roommate, testified that Black's companion came into his bedroom where he was 
sleeping and searched his pants pockets (R. 165:64-67). While defendant searched the 
apartment, Black removed Gonzales's ring, almost ripping his finger off (R. 165:41, 45-47, 
83; State's Ex. 6). Defendant took Gonzales's wallet, which contained $1,600 to $1,700 in 
cash, plus a paycheck (R. 165:42). 
During the encounter, Gonzales screamed for help (R. 165:47). After twenty or thirty 
minutes, Gonzales's cousin, Alfredo, came from an adjoining apartment to help (R. 165:47, 
57). Alfredo held Black down while Gonzales chased defendant (R.165:41, 47-48). Salt 
2
 Except as otherwise noted, this brief recites the facts in the light most favorable to 
the jury's verdict. See State v. Litherland, 2000 UT 76, f 2, 12 P.3d 92. 
3 
Lake Police Officer Shellie Woods, responding to a report of a fight, saw Gonzales, covered 
in blood, running down the sidewalk (R. 165:74-75). Officer Woods stopped Gonzales and 
escorted him back to the apartment, where Alberto had subdued Black (R. 165:75-76, 78-
80). The first things Officer Woods noticed were that the door frame appeared to have been 
kicked in and the apartment was in disarray (R. 165:76-78, 82; State's Ex. 7-9). Black was 
found with Gonzales's ring in his pocket and was arrested; defendant escaped (R. 165:81). 
Blaine Black was convicted of aggravated burglary and robbery in connection with 
this incident (R. 165:88). He admitted that he accompanied defendant, "Reef," to the 
apartment to help defendant scare the victims and that he held one of them down while 
defendant "smash[ed]" one of the victims with a spotlight "quite a few times" (R. 165:89-
98). 
On December 4,2002, Salt Lake City Police Officer David Hendricks observed three 
men chasing another man near 567 East 600 South (R.165:48, 108-09). Officer Hendricks 
stopped one of the men, Gonzales, who told him about the April 25 attack and that he was 
chasing his assailant (R. 165:48-49, 109-110). Officer Hendricks then stopped defendant, 
who told the officer that his name was "Scott Slagle," and arrested him. (R. 165:109-111). 
The Lineup 
On June 26,2003, Salt Lake County Sheriffs Officer Doug Olsen told defendant that 
he would be participating in a lineup that day (R.165:l 17, 126). He noticed that defendant 
had changed his appearance from his booking photograph—he had grown an "Amish" type 
beard and shaved the center of his head (R.165:120; Defendant's Ex. 14). He told defendant 
4 
not to change his appearance any further (R. 165:120). About an hour later, Housing Officer 
Nathan Cahoon observed defendant wipe his face with a gray substance (R. 165:125,127). 
Defendant told Officer Cahoon that he was trying to darken his face to look like the other 
participants in the lineup (R. 165:128). During the lineup, Gonzales identified defendant as 
the person who broke into his apartment on April 25, 2002 and attacked him (R.165:58, 60; 
State's exhibit 17). 
Defendant testified, denying any involvement in the incident (R. 165:133-38). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The trial court correctly refused to order a dismissal under the speedy trial statute. 
Defendant failed preserve this issue because his cursory assertions were not sufficiently 
specific or timely to trigger the court's duty to review the matter. However, any error was 
harmless because the 120-day period had not expired. 
POINT II 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in allowing officers' testimony that revealed 
that defendant was incarcerated at the time of the lineup, the basis for defendant's motion for 
a mistrial. The trial court properly ruled that defendant waived any objection to such 
evidence because defense counsel's opening statement invited the officers' testimony and 
suggested that defendant was incarcerated at the lineup. Also, defendant waived any 
ineffective assistance of counsel claim when he consciously chose not to request a curative 




THE COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO 
ADDRESS DEFENDANT'S 120-DAY DISPOSITION REQUEST; BY 
NOT MOVING TO DISMISS THE ACTION, DEFENDANT FAILED 
TO TRIGGER THE COURT'S REVIEW; ANY ERROR WAS 
HARMLESS BECAUSE THE 120-DAYS HAD NOT EXPIRED 
Defendant claims that the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider and 
grant his motion to dismiss the case because the prosecution failed to bring the case to trial 
within 120 days following his request for disposition under the Utah Speedy Trial Statute, 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (West 2004). Aplt. Br. at 10-13. The claim fails because 
defendant's brief statements at trial failed to trigger the court's statutory duty to consider the 
matter. Even if the court erred by not addressing the matter, the error was harmless. 
Although the prosecution generally bears the burden of showing that the statute has been 
complied with, that burden arises only after a defendant properly requests the 120-day 
disposition. Under the statute, the 120-day period begins on the date of delivery of the 
request to the custodial officer, evidenced by the custodian's certified receipt, not the date 
of the defendant's alleged execution of the request. Here, because defendant was tried within 
120 days of the receipt of his request for disposition, any error in the court's failure to rule 
on the proceeding was harmless. 
6 
A. By failing to move to dismiss the case, defendant failed to 
trigger the trial court's duty to rule on the proceeding. 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1(1) provides that a prisoner with a pending information 
is entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days after he "deliver[s] to the . . . 
custodial officer . . . a written demand . . . requesting disposition of the pending charge." 
On July 15, 2003, an authorized agent at the Salt Lake County Jail acknowledged 
receipt of defendant's request for disposition of charges in this case (R. 45) (Addendum B). 
Although the disposition request indicated that the request was received on July 15, the 
request bore the date June 20, 2003, as the date on which the request was made (R. 45). 
Defendant was tried on October 28, 2003 (R. 165). October 28 is 130 days from June 20, 
and 105 days from July 15. On appeal, defendant claims that his convictions should be 
dismissed with prejudice because he was not tried within 120 days of the delivery of his 
request to jail authorities, as provided under the speedy trial statute. Aplt. Br. at 10-13. He 
particularly claims that "the trial court abused its discretion by refusing to consider and grant 
defendant's motion to dismiss because trial was not brought within the 120-day disposition 
period." Aplt. Br. at 10. 
The general rule in criminal cases is that"'a contemporaneous objection or some form 
of specific preservation of claims of error must be made a part of the trial court record before 
an appellate court will review such claims'" State v. Johnson, 11A P.2d 1141, 1144 (Utah 
1989 (quoting State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546, 551 (Utah 1987)); see also State v. Holgate, 
2000 UT 74, ^11 , 10P.3d346. 
7 
Thus "[i]n order to preserve an issue for appeal, it 'must be raised in a timely fashion, 
must be specifically raised such that the issue is sufficiently raised to a level of consciousness 
before the trial court, and must be supported by evidence or relevant legal authority.'" State 
v. Richins, 2004 UT App 36, U 8 (quoting State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, f 19, 58 P.3d 
879 (quotations and citations omitted)); see also Tolman v. Winchester Hills Water Co., Inc., 
912 P.2d 457,460 (Utah Ct. App. 1996) (holding objection at trial must "'be specific enough 
to give the trial court notice of the very error. .. complained of") (quoting Beehive Medical 
Elecs., Inc. v. Square D. Co., 699 P.2d 859, 860 (Utah 1983)). 
Here, defendant's motion was insufficiently specific to inform the trial court that he 
was moving the court to dismiss the case. The statute provides: "In the event the charge is 
not brought to trial within 120 days, or within such continuance as has been granted, and 
defendant or his counsel moves to dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding." 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1(4) (emphasis added). 
Defendant never moved the trial court to dismiss the action. Before the jury was 
impaneled, there was an unrecorded bench conference (R. 165:5). After the jury was 
impaneled, the court reminded defense counsel that "[o]ne thing you wanted to address, Mr. 
Simms, at this stage, was the 120-day notice of disposition, which was apparently filed by 
the defendant " (R. 165:28). Defendant's entire presentation to the court concerning the 
matter was as follows: 
Mr. Simms [defense counsel]: These are the documents that the defendant 
handed me this morning. I think his argument is that he gave the jail 
authorities the 120-day disposition on June 20th, despite the fact that 
8 
it's marked by the jail officials as July 12, 2003. 
The Court: That's his position? 
Mr. Simms: Yes. 
(R. 165:28-29).3 
The court noted the discrepancy and declined to resolve the matter because it raised 
an issue of fact that could not be resolved at that point (R. 165:29). The court noted that this 
was the first time that it had heard of any disposition issue. The court concluded by stating 
that "without ruling on the propriety or impropriety of the motion, you have preserved your 
record in that regard, Mr. Simms" (R. 165:29-30). 
Defendant's two-sentence presentation hardly constitutes a motion to dismiss. 
Additionally, he failed to argue any evidence or authority to resolve the narrow issue he did 
raise, whether June 20 or July 15 began the 120-day period. 
Therefore, because defendant's presentation could not constitute a motion to dismiss 
that would have triggered the court's duty to consider his claim, the trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in declining to consider it. However, even if the trial court did abuse its 
discretion in failing to consider the motion, any error was harmless. 
B. Defendant was tried within the 120-day disposition period; 
therefore, he was not entitled to a dismissal of the information. 
Under the speedy trial statute, 120-day disposition period begins on the date the 
prisoner "deliver[s]" the request to the custodial officer. Utah Code Ann. § 77-29-1 (1). 
3
 The transcript of the proceedings are attached at Addendum B. 
9 
Case law establishes that the date of delivery is not the date a prisoner executes the 
disposition request, but the date on which the custodial authority receives it. In this case, the 
disposition request unambiguously shows that an authorized agent of the Salt Lake County 
Jail received defendant's notice and request for disposition on July 15,2003. July 15 is 105 
days before trial, October 28,2003. Therefore, because defendant was tried within 120 days 
of trial, he was not entitled to a dismissal of the information under the statute. 
Utah's speedy trial statute is designed to promote the prompt prosecution of charges 
against prisoners, to ensure trial while witnesses are available and memories are fresh, and 
to more precisely define "speedy trial" as it applies under our state constitution. State v. 
Viles, 702 P.2d 1175,1176 (Utah 1985); State v. Wilson, 22 Utah 2d 361,453 P.2d 158,159 
(Utah 1969) (addressing purpose of previous version of statute). In support of those 
objectives, the law places on the prosecution the ultimate burden of bringing the matter to 
trial within 120 days of the delivery of a disposition request. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 
(4) ("If the court finds that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard 
with the time required is not supported by good cause . . . the court shall order the matter 
dismissed with prejudice."); State v. Petersen, 810 P.2d 421, 424 (Utah 1991) and Wilson, 
453 P.2d at 160 (describing prosecutor's burden). 
However, the speedy trial statute places on defendant the threshold burden of 
triggering the prosecution's duty to have the case tried within the 120-day period. As stated, 
the statute provides that "[w]henever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in . . . [a] 
j a i l . . . , and there is pending against the prisoner... any untried indictment or information, 
10 
and the prisoner shall deliver to the... custodial officer in authority,... a written demand 
specifying the nature of the charge . . . and requesting disposition of the pending charge, he 
shall be entitled to have the charge brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of 
the written notice." UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (1) (emphasis added). 
Utah case law makes clear that the 120-day period does not begin to run until 
defendant has successfully carried his burden of delivering his request to the custodial 
authority. See State v. Wright, 745 P.2d 447, 450-51 (Utah 1987) (the disposition request 
must be properly delivered to proper authorities and contain an appropriate demand to be 
effective); State v. Viles, 702 P.2d 1175 (Utah 1985) ("Section 77-29-1 places the burden 
on the prisoner to give notice to the warden."); State v. Lindsay, 2000 UT App 379, ^ 7, 18 
P.3d 504 ("After a prisoner appropriately requests speedy resolution of pending charges, the 
burden shifts to the prosecution to commence trial within the 120-day period set out in the 
statute.") (emphasis added). 
Utah's courts have further held that delivery is established by the custodial authority' s 
receipt of the disposition request, not the defendant's execution or filing of it. In State v. 
Heaton, the defendant filed a written request for final disposition of all matters pending 
against him under section 77-29-1 on August 25, 1994. State v. Heaton, 958 P.2d 911,913 
(Utah 1998). An authorized agent at the prison received the notice on September 3, 1994, 
nine days after Heaton had filed it. Id. Reviewing the trial court's denial of the defendant's 
motion to dismiss, the Utah Supreme Court explained that the speedy trial statue "clearly 
provides that the 120-day period commences on the date the written notice is delivered 'to 
11 
the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in authority, or any appropriate agent of the same.'" 
Id. at 916 (quoting UTAH CODE ANN. §77-29-1(1)). The court specifically found that" 120-
day disposition period commenced on . . . the date on which an authorized agent at the prison 
received [the defendant's] written notice," not on the date that defendant signed the notice. 
Id. 
The principle that "delivery" is established by the custodial authority's "receipt," and 
not the prisoner's "execution" or "filing" was also applied in State v. Coleman, 2001UT App 
281, 34 P.3d 281. There, the defendant executed the 120-day notice on October 28, 1999; 
the Utah State Prison stamped the notice, "received," on November 15,1999, eighteen days 
after Coleman "allegedly" executed it. 2001 UT App 281, fflf 2, 6 n.7. The trial court found 
that the 120-day period began on November 16, 1999, the day after the Utah State Prison 
stamped the defendant's notice "received." Id. (quotation marks in original). On appeal, 
Coleman contended that the 120-day period began on October 28,1999, "the day defendant 
allegedly executed the notice." Id. This Court held the trial court's use of the November 16 
date, the "received" stamp on the 120-day notice, and the lack of any other evidence 
supporting the contention that the true date of receipt was October 28, was sufficient 
evidence to support the trial court's ruling that the 120-day period began on November 16. 
Id. 
Based on the foregoing, the date on which the 120-day disposition period began to run 
is July 15,2003, and not June 20,2003, as defendant contends. In deciding whether a district 
court properly denied a motion to dismiss under the speedy trial statute, the reviewing court 
12 
"must [first] determine when the 120-day period commenced and when it expired. Coleman, 
2001 UT App 281, f^ 6 (citation omitted).4 Here, the trial court did not make findings on this 
threshold inquiry. Defendant asserts that the disposition period should begin on June 20, 
2003 and would expire on October 18, 2003. Aplt. Br. at 12. However defendant provides 
no evidence, other than defendant's self-serving assertion, that June 20, 2003 is the date on 
which he delivered his request (R. 165:28-29). However, it is undisputed that July 15,2003 
is the date on which an authorized agent received defendant's request (R. 45). Based on the 
foregoing discussion, this is the date on which the 120-day disposition period began to run. 
4
 Because the chronology of the proceedings in this matter is helpful to 
resolving the issue on appeal, the relevant dates and corresponding facts are as follows: 
4/25/02 Defendant broke into victim's apartment, assaulted victims and stolen 
victim's wallet (R.2-4, 165:38-42). 
12/4/02 Defendant was arrested (R. 165:108, 111). 
5/15/03 Defendant was charged by information with one count of aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony; one count of robbery, a second degree felony; 
and two counts of assault, class B misdemeanors (R.2-4). 
5/19/03 Defendant appears before Judge Judith S. Atherton for his initial appearance 
and counsel is appointed (R. 17-18). 
6/5/03 Defendant's counsel files motion to withdraw (R.28-29). 
6/11/03 Defendant's counsel files notice of appearance (R.30-31). 
6/20/03 Defendant dates request of disposition (R.45, 88). 
7/8/03 State amends information, charging defendant with on count of aggravated 
burglary, a first degree felony; one count of robbery, a second degree felony; 
and one court of aggravated assault, a third degree felony (R.41-42). 
7/15/03 Authorized agent receives defendant's request for disposition (R.45, 88). 
8/26/03 Preliminary hearing is held, defendant pleads not guilty, and is bound-over 
for trial (R.48-49). 
10/28-29/03 Jury trial is held (R.85-86, 135-136). Defendant was conviction of all three 
charges (R.128-130). 
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Trial began on October 28,2003,105 days after July 15(R. 165). Consequently, the 120-day 
period had not expired on the date of trial. 
In addition to providing no evidence that June 20, 2003 was the date on which 
defendant delivered his disposition request, the information in the request strongly suggests 
that defendant actually misdated it. Defendant's disposition request includes the amended 
charge of aggravated assault, a third degree felony (R.45). However, defendant was not 
charged with aggravated assault until July 8, 2003, eighteen days after he claims to have 
delivered the request (R.41-42). The validity of the request is further undermined by 
undisputed evidence of defendant's dissembling throughout the proceedings. When arrested 
and later interviewed, defendant repeatedly lied about his name and birth date (R. 165:109-
11,114-16). At the lineup, he attempted to disguise his appearance by shaving his head, 
growing a beard, and coloring his face (R. 165:120, 127). Accordingly, the evidence 
indicates that defendant did not deliver his request for disposition on June 20, 2004, as he 
asserts. 
In sum, applying well-established law to the undisputed facts, the 120-day disposition 
period began on July 15,2003 and ended on October 28,2003, a 105-day period. Since the 
120-day period had not expired at the date of trial, this Court should find any error in the trial 
court's refusal to consider defendant's claim harmless.5 
5
 While not critical to the resolution of this matter, the State notes that the 
disposition period should have been tolled for seven additional days, attributable to 
defendant's delay. See UTAH CODE ANN. § 77-29-1 (4) & (4) (120-day period may be 
extended by either party for good cause shown in open court); Coleman^ 2001 UT App 
281, \ 6 (noting that "good cause" excusing delay may be that caused by a defendant 
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POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN 
REFUSING TO GRANT A MISTRIAL BECAUSE EVIDENCE THAT 
DEFENDANT WAS INCARCERATED WAS INVITED BY 
DEFENDANT'S OPENING STATEMENT AND WAS NECESSARY TO 
DISPROVE DEFENSE'S THEORY 
Defendant claims that "the trial court abused its discretion for failing to grant a 
mistrial when the State introduced inflammatory and irrelevant evidence that [defendant] was 
a prisoner, thereby violating his rights to a fair trial. Aplt. Br. at 13. In the alternative, 
defendant claims that his trial counsel was ineffective for failing to request a curative 
instruction directing the jury to disregard evidence that defendant was incarcerated at the 
time of the lineup. Aplt. Br. at 16-17. The claim fails. Defendant invited any error by 
opening the door to the testimony, and he consciously rejected the trial court's offer of a 
curative instruction. In any event, evidence of guilt was overwhelming. 
A. The standard of review. 
A reviewing court will not reverse a trial court's denial of a motion for mistrial absent 
an abuse of discretion. State v. Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, \ 46, 27 P.3d 1133; see also State 
v. DeCorso, 1999 UT 57, ^|38, 993 P.2d 837; State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 266 (Utah 
1998); State v. Robertson, 932 P.2d 1219, 1230 (Utah 1997), overruled in part on other 
requesting a continuance); State v. Banner, 111 P.2d 1325, 1329-30 (Utah 1986) 
(defendant's delay of a trial constitutes a temporary waiver of his right to a speedy trial). 
On June 5, 2003 defendant's counsel moved to withdraw "on grounds that a 
conflict existed between him and defendant (R.28-29). Defendant's new counsel did not 
file a notice of appearance with the court until June 11, 2003 (R.30-31). As a 
consequence, no counsel appeared for defendant at a scheduled roll call on June 5, 2003, 
and the matter was continued to June 12 (R. 26). Therefore defendant is responsible for 
seven days of delay. 
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grounds, State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, f^ 25, n. 11, 61 P.3d 1000. "In exercising its discretion, 
and' [i]n view of the practical necessity of avoiding mistrials and getting litigation finished, 
the trial court should not grant a mistrial except where the circumstances are such as to 
reasonably indicate... that a fair trial cannot be had' and that a mistrial is necessary to avoid 
injustice." Butterfield, 2001 UT 59, ^ 46 (citation omitted). In other words, if "the [trial] 
court concludes that the incident probably did not prejudice the jury . . . the court should 
deny the motion." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1230-31 (emphasis added). 
Accordingly, "after the trial court has exercised its discretion and made its judgment, 
the prerogative of the reviewing court is much more limited." Robertson, 932 P.2d at 1231. 
"Unless a review of the record shows that the court's decision is plainly wrong in that the 
incident so likely influenced the jury that the defendant cannot be said to have had a fair trial, 
[the reviewing court] will not find that the court's decision was an abuse of discretion." Id. 
The reviewing court gives deference to the trial court's ruling "because of the advantaged 
position of the trial judge to determine the impact of events occurring in the courtroom on 
the total proceedings." Id. 
B. The factual background. 
In opening statement, defense counsel explained the theory of the defense—defendant 
was not involved in the incident and was being made a scapegoat because his foolishness and 
pranksterism made him an easy target (R. 165:34-36) (Addendum C). In support of that 
theory, counsel showed a blown up photograph of the defendant at the lineup, in which the 
defendant was dressed in prison clothes (R. 165:35; Defense exhibit 10). Repeatedly 
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referring to the photograph, counsel argued that defendant's attempts to disguise himself, 
by shaving the center of his head and coloring his face with pencil lead, showed his 
foolishness and exemplified how easy a target he was of witnesses who would finger him (R. 
165:35-36). 
At trial, Jail Officers Olsen and Cahoon testified that in preparing the lineup they 
discovered that defendant had tried to disguise himself by partly shaving his head, growing 
a distinctive beard, and wiping his face with gray coloring (R. 165:117, 120, 126-28). The 
officers also mentioned that they had retrieved defendant from his cell for the lineup after he 
had had a visit (R. 165:124, 126-28). Defense counsel did not object to this testimony (R. 
165:124, 126-28). 
At the close of the State's case, defendant moved for a mistrial (R. 165:130) 
(Addendum C). He argued that his reference in opening argument to defendant's foolishness 
at the lineup did not imply that he was in custody since all lineup participants, even those not 
in custody, were routinely put in jail clothes (R. 165:130-32). However, he argued, the 
officers' reference to defendant's jail cell prejudicially indicated that he was in custody (R. 
165:131). In response, the prosecutor stated that he introduced the officers' testimony only 
because defendant had discussed it first in opening statements when he displayed the blown 
up jail picture (R. 165:131). He further argued that he had not explored defendant's being 
incarcerated and that he could not respond to defendant's theory without calling the jail 
officers who conducted the lineup (R. 165:131). 
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The trial court ruled that defendant had waived any objection to the testimony through 
his opening statement. The court explained that "one might reasonably infer [from 
photograph of defendant] that.. . [defendant] is in custody at the time this lineup took place" 
(R. 165:132) (Addendum C). The trial court further held that "the state, in an effort to present 
a, so to speak, guilty mind, rather than simply a jokester trying to change his appearance, was 
within proper bounds by presenting the evidence" (R. 165:132). 
In view of any concern of defendant that he might be prejudiced by its ruling, the 
court offered defendant a curative instruction directing the jury to disregard any inference 
that defendant was in custody at the time of the lineup (R. 165:33). Notwithstanding its 
offer, the court noted that it did not believe defendant had been prejudiced by the officers' 
allusions to his having been in custody (R. 165:133). Defendant did not respond to the offer 
(R. 165:133). 
C. Testimony that defendant was incarcerated was proper 
because defendant invited the evidence from opening statement. 
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion for a 
mistrial. The court properly found that any obj ection to the lineup officer's testimony waived 
by defense counsel's opening statement (R. 165:132). See State v. Tillman, 750 P.2d 546,561 
(Utah 1987) (holding that counsel's initiation of remarks "waived any objection" to 
prosecutor's rebuttal). 
In Tillman, during closing argument, defense counsel emphasized that the defendant 
would probably be a 67-year-old man when he got out of prison following a life sentence, 
"broken and old and incapable of causing damage to anyone." 750 P.2d at 559-60. In 
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response, the prosecutor questioned whether defendant would be a better person fifteen years 
hence when he got out of prison given the lack of remorse he had shown during the trial. Id. 
at 560. Defendant then contended on appeal that the prosecutor's comments "were 
misleading and had the potential of improperly influencing [the jury's] decision on the death 
penalty." Id. 
In rej ecting this argument, the Utah Supreme Court noted that "it was defense counsel 
who first commented that in Utah, parole is a possibility under a life sentence." Id. The 
court held that while the prosecutor's remarks "were arguably improper and prejudicial. . 
. , his comments, when placed within the context of his and defense counsel's entire 
arguments, fall within the ambit of permitted conduct." Id. See also State v. Creviston, 646 
P.2d 750, 754 (Utah 1982) (no misconduct in prosecutor's comments on the significance of 
the defendant's presence at drug sale, made in direct response to a theory of the defense); 
State v. Valdez, 30 Utah 2d 54, 513 P.2d 422,425 (Utah 1993) (no prosecutorial misconduct 
where the prosecutor's rebuttal was in direct reply to theory advanced by defense in its final 
argument and remarks were within the range of reasonable inferences to be drawn from the 
evidence); State v. Bowman, 945 P.2d 153,157 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (finding no misconduct 
in arguing in rebuttal that the defendant had the option to call missing witness where the 
defendant opened the door by arguing in closing that he should be acquitted based on the 
State's failure to call the witness). 
Alternatively, a defendant's opening the door to an allegedly improper response 
constitutes invited error. See Tillman, 750 P.2d at 561 ("Inasmuch as defense counsel 
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himself chose to initiate and argue these comments and failed to object to the prosecutor's 
response to the same, he should be deemed to have invited the error (if there was any) and 
waived any objection."). "The doctrine of invited error 'prohibits a party from setting up an 
error at trial and then complaining of it on appeal.'" State v. Perdue, 813 P.2d 1201, 1205 
(Utah Ct. App. 1991). This Court will decline to review a claim based on an error the 
defendant invited. State v. Medina, 738 P.2d 1021, 1022-23 (Utah 1987) (declining to 
review a challenge to a jury instruction stipulated to by defense counsel at trial under invited 
error doctrine). 
In this case, defendant opened the door to Officers Olsen's and Cahoon's testimony 
that instead of merely acting foolishly, defendant had tried to disguise himself before the 
lineup. The trial court found that the prosecutor justifiably elicited the officers' testimony 
in response to defendant's opening statement (R. 165:132). More importantly, the court 
found that one could reasonably infer from the blown up photograph that defendant was in 
custody at time of the lineup (R. 165:132). [n fact, Officer Hendricks had earlier testified, 
also without obj ection, that he arrested the de fendant on December 4,2002 (R. 165:109-111). 
From this testimony, a reasonable juror could have concluded that defendant was 
incarcerated at the time of the lineup. See Bowman, 94 5 P .2d at 15 7 (defendant waived right 
to cautionary instruction as to scope of defendant's statements admitted for impeachment 
purposes, where statements were previously admitted in State's substantive case-in-chief 
without objection). 
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In short, defendant not only waived his claim that the trial court erred in denying his 
mistrial motion, but he also invited any error through his opening statement. The Court 
should decline to consider the merits of defendant's claim. In any case, the trial court did not 
abuse its discretion in denying defendant's motion. 
D. Evidence that defendant was incarcerated while 
awaiting trial is not prohibited by Rule 404(b). 
Defendant cursorily suggests, in two sentences, that admission of the officers' 
testimony violated rule 404(b), Utah Rules of Evidence, because allusion to defendant's 
being a jail inmate suggested that he had a propensity to commit crime. Aplt. Br. at 14. 
Because defendant's argument is devoid of any relevant authority, analysis, or reference to 
the pertinent record, this Court should decline to consider it. See State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 304 (Utah 1998) ("It is well established that a reviewing court will not address 
arguments that are not adequately briefed."); State v. Wareham, 772 P.2d 960, 966 (Utah 
1989) (declining to rule on issue where defendant's brief "wholly lacked legal analysis and 
authority to support his argument"). 
Even if rule 404(b) were applicable, it would not prohibit admission of the officers' 
testimony in the circumstances of this case. A defendant may not "on appeal attack the 
admission of [evidence] because he himself opened the door to its introduction." State v. 
Ramos, 882 P.2d 149, 154 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (rejecting challenge to admission of mug 
shot under rule 404(b)) (citing State v. Barney, 681 P.2d 1230,1231 (Utah 1984). In Ramos, 
the court explained that "[fjederal case law similarly prohibits a defendant from challenging 
the admission of prior bad acts evidence when he or she was responsible for its introduction. 
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Ramos, 882 P.2d at 154 (citing United States v. Guinn, 454 F.2d 29, 37 (5th Cir.), cert 
denied, 407 U.S. 911, 92 S. Ct. 2437 (1972)). 
By seeking to show that his conduct in the jail explained why he was a scapegoat in 
this incident, defendant opened the door for the State to introduce testimony of the lineup 
officers to rebut the defense's theory. In questioning both Officer Cahoon and Olsen, the 
prosecutor sought only to rebut that defendant's conduct at the lineup was not mere 
foolishness, but an attempt to disguise his appearance in order to avoid being identified, a 
characterization defendant did not object to below and does not challenge on appeal. There 
is no evidence that the prosecutor introduced the officers' testimony to show that defendant 
was inclined to commit crime.6 
E. Even if lineup officers' testimony was improper, any error was 
harmless because evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. 
This court "will not reverse a conviction unless the error is substantial and prejudicial 
in the sense that there is a reasonable likelihood that in its absence there would have been a 
more favorable result for the defendant." State v. Schultz, 2002 UT App 366, <f 31, 58 P.3d 
879 (quotations and citations omitted). See also State v. Bishop, 753 P.2d 439, 500 (Utah 
1988) (holding that the "harmless error standard requires a reversal unless the overwhelming 
6
 Defendant attempts to analogize this case to Chess v. State, 617 P.2d 341 (Utah 
1980). Aplt. Br. at 14-16. In Chess, defendant was dressed in prison clothes throughout 
the trial, thereby acting as a "constant reminder of the accused's condition." Id. at 345 
(quotations and citations omitted). Here, because the evidence of defendant's 
incarceration during the lineups was not constantly before the jury, and because defendant 
invited the evidence, Chess is inapplicable. 
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evidence shows that the result would have been no different in the absence of the error") 
(quotations and citations omitted) (emphasis added). 
Here, the evidence of defendant's guilt was overwhelming. Gonzales testified that 
defendant and Black broke into his apartment and that defendant beat him almost into 
unconsciousness (R. 165:165:38-40,43-45; State's Ex. 2 & 3). He also testified that Black 
pulled his ring off so brutally that his finger was nearly torn off, a condition corroborated by 
a police officer moments after the attack (R. 165:41, 45-47, 83; State's Ex. 6). He also 
testified that defendant stole his wallet, in which he had $1,600 to $1,700 in cash, plus a 
paycheck (R. 165:42). Gonzales saw defendant at close range while being attacked. 
Although defendant was initially masked, defendant removed the mask before he fled from 
Gonzales's apartment (R. 165:39, 41, 62) ). Gonzales consistently identified defendant as 
his assailant near his apartment seven months after the attack, at the lineup, and at trial (R. 
165:40, 48, 58, 60, 108-10; State's Ex. 17). Black, defendant's accomplice, found at the 
crime scene with Gonzales's ring, also identified defendant as the person who committed the 
crimes charged (R. 165:81, 89-98). When he was arrested, defendant repeatedly gave a false 
name and birth date (R. 165:109-11,113-16). At the lineup, defendant attempted to disguise 
his appearance (R. 165:120, 125-27; Defendant's Ex. 14). In light of this overwhelming 
evidence that defendant committed the offenses, any error in admitting evidence that 
defendant was incarcerated at the time of the lineup was harmless. 
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F. Defendant's claim of ineffective assistance of counsel 
fails because his counsel's failure to request a curative 
jury instruction was conscious trial strategy. 
In the alternative, defendant claims that his trial counsel was "ineffective for failing 
to request a curative instruction that the jury was not to consider [his] incarceration in 
determining the charges against him." Aplt. Br. at 16-17. To prove ineffective assistance 
of counsel, a defendant must show that his counsel's performance was objectively deficient 
and that counsel's performance prejudiced the defendant. State v. Kelley, 2000 UT 41,f 25, 
1 P.3d 546 (quotations and citations omitted). 
"Defendant has the burden of demonstrating that counsels 'performance fell below 
an objective standard of reasonable professional judgment,5 and that counsel's actions were 
not conscious trial strategy." State v. Ellifritz, 835 P.2d 170, 174 (Utah Ct. App. 1992) 
(citation omitted). "[T]he defendant must overcome 'a strong presumption that counsel's 
conduct falls within the wide range of reasonable professional assistance.'" State v. Strain, 
885 P.2d 810, 814 (Utah Ct. App. 1994) (quoting Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
689, 104 S. Ct. 2052, 2065 (1984)). "This court will not second-guess trial counsel's 
legitimate strategic choices, however flawed those choices might appear in retrospect." Id. 
(citations omitted). See State v. Tennyson, 850 P.2d 461,468 (Utah Ct. App. 1993) (noting 
that given Strickland's strong presumption of competence, "we need only articulate some 
plausible strategic explanation for counsel's behavior"); State v. Cosey, 873 P.2d 1177,1180 
(Utah Ct. App.) ("Even when trial counsel allows the ultimate selection of a juror who 
initially appeared biased on voir dire, 'courts deny the ineffective assistance claim unless 
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counsel's actions could not conceivably constitute legitimate trial tactics.'") (quoting 
Tennyson, 850 P.2d at 469), cert denied, 883 P.2d 1359 (Utah 1994). 
It is reasonable for counsel to avoid emphasizing damaging evidence. See State v. 
Holbert, 2002 UT App 426, *{ 58-59, 61 P.3d 291 (finding refusal to request curative 
instruction that would emphasize witness's damaging testimony a reasonable tactical choice); 
State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 269 (Utah, 1998) (same). 
Here, defense counsel's refusal of the trial court's invitation to offer the jury a 
curative instruction was evidently conscious trial strategy. After denying defendant's motion 
for a mistrial, the court offered to give a curative instruction to the jury to disregard that 
defendant was in custody at the time of the lineup (R. 165:133). Defense counsel did not 
accept the offer, and as a result, the trial court did not give such an instruction (R. 16 5:13 3). 
Counsel' s choice not to request a curative instruction was evidently conscious and reasonable 
because the instruction would only have emphasized the fact of defendant's incarceration, 
the very basis of defendant's mistrial motion. Consequently, defendant has failed to show 
that his counsel performed deficiently in refusing a curative instruction. 
In any event, as set out above, defendant has failed to establish any prejudice because 
evidence of guilt was overwhelming. Additionally, the trial court, which was in a privileged 
position to observe the proceedings, commented that it did not believe defendant had been 
prejudiced by the officers' allusions to his having been in custody (R. 165:133). 
In sum, defendant has failed to show that he received ineffective assistance of counsel. 
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CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, defendant's convictions should be affirmed. 
RESPECTFULLY submitted on 7^_ February, 2005. 
MARK L. SHURTLEFF 
Attorney General 
KENNETH A. BRONSTON 
Assistant Attorney General 
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DISPOSITION OF DETAINERS AGAINST PRISONERS 
§ 77—29-1. Prisoner's demand for disposition of pending charge—Duties of 
custodial officer—Continuance may be granted—Dismissal of charge for 
failure to bring to trial 
(1) Whenever a prisoner is serving a term of imprisonment in the state 
prison, jail or other penal or correctional institution of this state, and there is 
pending against the prisoner in this state any untried indictment or informa-
tion, and the prisoner shall deliver to the warden, sheriff or custodial officer in 
authority, or any appropriate agent of the same, a written demand specifying 
the nature of the charge and the court wherein it is pending and requesting 
disposition of the pending charge, he shall be entitled to have the charge 
brought to trial within 120 days of the date of delivery of written notice. 
(2) Any warden, sheriff or custodial officer, upon receipt of the demand 
described in Subsection (1), shall immediately cause the demand to be forward-
ed by personal delivery or certified mail, return receipt requested, to the 
appropriate prosecuting attorney and court clerk. The warden, sheriff or 
custodial officer shall, upon request of the prosecuting attorney so notified, 
provide the attorney with such information concerning the term of commitment 
of the demanding prisoner as shall be requested. 
(3) After written demand is delivered as required in Subsection (1), the 
prosecuting attorney or the defendant or his counsel, for good cause shown in 
open court, with the prisoner or his counsel being present, may be granted any 
reasonable continuance. 
(4) In the event the charge is not brought to trial within 120 days, or within 
such continuance as has been granted, and defendant or his counsel moves to 
dismiss the action, the court shall review the proceeding. If the court finds 
that the failure of the prosecuting attorney to have the matter heard within the 
time required is not supported by good cause, whether a previous motion for 
continuance was made or not, the court shall order the matter dismissed with 
prejudice. 




NOTICE AND REQUEST FOR DISPOSITION OF PENDING CHARGES' u ^ u 
(120 DISPOSITION NOTICE PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE ANlSh^7-gf-107 ?u \Q: 37 
CLERK OF -MI DISTRICT COtT 
TO: JAIL WARDEN , ,
 03i?^$J>^ 
NOTICE is hereby given that I, Cheriff Mahi5 do hereby request final disposition 
of any and all charges now pending against me in any court in the State of Utah. Charges 
of: 
Aggravated Robbery, 1st Degree Felony, Aggravated Burglary, 1st Degree Felony and 
Aggravated Assault, 3* Degree Felony. Case Number 031903250. Third District Court. 
that are now pending against me in SALT LAKE COUNTY, and request is hereby made 
that you forward this notice to the appropriate authorities in that county or counties., 
together with such information as required by law. 
Dated this day of _ 2003. 
Inmate: Cheriff Mahi Social Security Number: 3 7 k 7 8 9 8 / 7 
I hereby certify that I received a copy of the foregoing NOTICE this /S~~ day of 
JoL7 20Q3 • 
^ 
Aumor&pd'Agent 
J ^ / / / k ^ GK*AS Jail, Utah 
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ANYONE TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU OR IN YOUR PRESENCE. YOU MUST 
NOT VIEW ANY MEDIA REPORTS ABOUT THIS TRIAL. I HAVE NO BELIEF 
THERE WILL BE ANY, BUT YOU MUST KEEP AN OPEN MIND TIL YOU'VE 
HEARD ALL THE EVIDENCE IN THE CASE AND, THEREFORE, NOT DISCUSS 
IT WITH ANYONE. IF ANYONE ATTEMPTS TO DISCUSS IT WITH YOU I 
WANT YOU TO REPORT IT TO MYSELF OR THE BAILIFF IMMEDIATELY. 
I WILL REMIND YOU OF THAT ADMONITION AT EACH RECESS 
JUST SO YOU'RE CONSTANTLY AWARE THAT THAT IS THE RULE. 
WE WILL NOW EXCUSE THE JURY AND WE'LL DEAL WITH A 
COUPLE OF LEGAL MATTERS HERE WHILE THE JURY IS EXCUSED. THANK 
YOU, FOLKS. 
(WHEREUPON, THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM) . 
THE COURT: THE JURY HAS EXITED THE COURTROOM. THE 
DEFENDANT AND ALL COUNSEL ARE PRESENT. 
ONE THING YOU WANTED TO ADDRESS, MR. SIMMS, AT THIS 
STAGE, WAS THE 120-DAY NOTICE OF DISPOSITION, WHICH WAS 
APPARENTLY FILED BY THE DEFENDANT, IT APPEARS PRO SE, ON OR 
ABOUT JULY 30TH — EXCUSE ME, JULY 17TH OF THIS YEAR WAS THE 
DATE FOR FILING, FROM THE FILE AT LEAST AS I HAVE IN FRONT OF 
ME. 
MR. SIMMS: YOUR HONOR, IF I MAY APPROACH? 
THE COURT: YES, YOU MAY. 
MR. SIMMS: THESE ARE DOCUMENTS THAT THE DEFENDANT 
HANDED ME THIS MORNING. I THINK HIS ARGUMENT IS THAT HE GAVE 
THE JAIL AUTHORITIES THE 120-DAY DISPOSITION ON JUNE 20TH, 
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DESPITE THE FACT THAT IT'S MARKED BY THE JAIL OFFICIALS AS JULY 
15TH, 2003. 
THE COURT: THAT'S HIS POSITION? 
MR. SIMMS: YES. 
THE COURT: DO YOU WISH TO RESPOND, MR. KNELL? 
MR. KNELL: YES, YOUR HONOR. I BELIEVE MY COPY ALSO 
SAYS JUNE 20TH. I GUESS IT WASN'T RECEIVED BY JAIL PERSONNEL 
UNTIL JULY 15TH. HOWEVER, I THINK THERE WAS A GOOD FAITH 
EXCEPTION HERE, IN THAT THE DEFENDANT WAS NOT TRANSPORTED ON 
SEVERAL OCCASIONS, AT LEAST THREE OR FOUR, WHEN HE WASN'T 
TRANSPORTED. SO I WOULD ARGUE THAT THE DEFENDANT HIMSELF HAS 
CAUSED ANY UNDUE DELAY. 
THE COURT: IT IS CLEAR THAT THE DATE THAT APPARENTLY 
MR. MAHI PLACED ON THE NOTICE WAS 20, JUNE. 
IT IS ALSO CLEAR THAT THE STATE, OR EXCUSE ME, THAT 
THE JAIL AUTHORITIES, JAIL AUTHORITIES PLACED THE DATE OF 15, 
JULY. THAT THEN CREATES, I SUPPOSE, AN ISSUE OF FACT IN THAT. 
SCENARIO, WHICH WE CAN NOT ADDRESS HERE TODAY. 
THIS IS THE FIRST TIME THAT IT HAS COME TO MY 
ATTENTION THAT WE HAD AN ISSUE OF THIS NATURE BEING PRESENTED. 
I'LL GRANT YOU THE ORIGINAL, OR A COPY OF THIS DOCUMENT WAS 
FILED ON JULY 17TH IN THE COURT FILE. AT THAT TIME THE FILE 
23 | WAS STILL WINDING ITS WAY, I BELIEVE, TO THIS COURT FROM THE 
PRELIMINARY STAGES. 
SO WITHOUT RULING ON THE PROPRIETY OR IMPROPRIETY OF 
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THE MOTION, YOU HAVE PRESERVED YOUR RECORD IN THAT REGARD, 
MR. SIMMS. 
MR. SIMMS: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. NOW WE'LL BE IN RECESS UNTIL 
WE BRING THE JURY BACK IN, APPROXIMATELY TEN MINUTES. 
AND MR. JACKSON, I'M GOING TO ASK YOU, SIR, TO 
REMAIN. I DEVELOPED THE IMPRESSION THAT YOU WERE RELUCTANT TO 
PARTICIPATE AS A JUROR IN THIS MATTER. 
MR. JACKSON: WELL, I'D LIKE TO, BUT I JUST DON'T 
BELIEVE I CAN CONSCIENTIOUSLY BE OF ANY VALUE TO YOU BECAUSE OF 
MY THOUGHTS. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. WELL, AND THEN, SO WHAT I'LL 
DO IS I'LL ASK YOU TO REMAIN AND OBSERVE THE TRIAL. AND IT MAY 
HAVE SOME EFFECT ON YOUR WILLINGNESS, THE NEXT TIME YOU'RE 
CALLED TO SERVE, WITHOUT POTENTIALLY PREJUDGING THE 
INSTRUCTIONS THAT HAVE BEEN GIVEN TO THE JURY. SO CERTAINLY, 
IF YOU HAVE TO GO TO THE RESTROOM OR RELIEVE YOURSELF YOU MAY 
DO SO, BUT I DO WANT YOU TO COME BACK AND OBSERVE THE TRIAL. 
MR. JACKSON: EACH DAY? 
THE COURT: WE'LL DISCUSS THAT AT THE END OF THE DAY 
TODAY. 
MR. JACKSON: OKAY. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU, FOLKS. WE'LL BE IN RECESS, 





MR. SIMMS: YES, THANK YOU. MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT. 
I THANK YOU, AND I KNOW MR. MAHI THANKS YOU FOR BEING HERE 
TODAY, BECAUSE HE'S ACTUALLY, IN FACT, INNOCENT. HE'S NOT 
GUILTY. I AGREE, WE AGREE WITH THE FACTS OF THE CASE, THAT 
THIS WAS A DASTARDLY DEED AND SOMEONE DID IT. BUT MR. MAHI WAS 
NOT THERE. 
IT IS A SIMPLE CASE. THE FACTS AREN'T IN DISPUTE. 
SOME TWO PEOPLE CAME INTO THE HOME, BUSTED IT IN, AND WHY DID 
THEY TARGET THIS HOUSE? WELL, IT'S A DRUG HOUSE. COCAINE, 
CASH, THAT'S WHAT THE PEOPLE WERE LOOKING FOR. 
MR. MAHI KNOWS BENITO, KNOWS VICTOR, AND KNOWS BLAINE 
BLACK BECAUSE HE USES DRUGS WITH 'EM. PURCHASING, SELLING 
DRUGS. THAT'S WHAT THIS IS ABOUT. BUT HE WASN'T THERE WHEN 
THIS EVENT OCCURRED. THEY'RE BLAMING HIM BECAUSE HE *S AN EASY 
TARGET, BECAUSE HE'S A FOOLISH PERSON. AND LET ME EXPLAIN TO 
YOU WHAT REALLY THIS CASE IS ALL ABOUT IN OUR VIEW. 
CAN YOUR HONOR SEE THAT? THANK YOU. THIS CASE IS 
VERY SIMPLE, MR. MAHI WASN'T THERE. IT WAS SOMEONE ELSE WHO 
DID THAT EVENT WITH MR. BLACK. MR. BLACK IS GOING TO COME IN 
HERE AND SAY HE'S NOT GETTING ANY OFFERS FROM THE STATE, HE'S 
NOT GETTING ANY FAVORABLE TREATMENT, HE'S JUST COMING IN AFTER 
BEING CONVICTED OF THIS CRIME, JUST OUT OF THE GOODNESS OF HIS 
HEART. HE'S GETTING NO TRADE OFF. WELL, THE TRADE OFF IS THAT 
HE GETS TO BLAME MAHI. AND THE PERSON WHO WAS REALLY INVOLVED, 
WHERE ARE THEY AT? 
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YOU'RE GOING TO SEE AND HEAR FROM BENITO, YOU'RE 
GOING TO HEAR FROM VICTOR, BUT THERE WAS SOMEONE ELSE THAT WAS 
THERE AS WELL. HIS NAME IS JUAN. JUAN'S INVOLVED IN THIS WITH 
THE MEXICAN DRUG TRADE, THE COCAINE, AND CASH. AND YOU ASK 
YOURSELF, WELL WHY WOULD THEY BLAME MR. MAHI FOR THIS? 
THIS IS MR. MAHI. THIS IS MR. MAHI AT THE LINEUP. 
HE'S A FOOLISH TYPE PERSON. HE'S THE PRANKSTER, HE'S THE CLASS 
CLOWN. IF YOU LOOK AT THIS PICTURE HE LOOKS VERY DIFFERENT 
THAN HE LOOKS HERE TODAY. HE KNEW THAT HE WAS GOING TO BE 
FALSELY BLAMED. AND HE'S SORT OF, AS A FOOLISH MOVE, DISGUISED 
HIS LOOK. HE SHAVED HIS HEAD AS IF HE WAS BALD, AS IF HE HAD 
MALE PATTERN BALDNESS. AND THEN HE COLORED HIMSELF WITH A 
PENCIL. YOU CAN SEE SOME OF THE CLOTS OF THE PENCIL RIGHT HERE 
AND SOME OF THE PENCIL MARK RIGHT HERE ON HIS SHIRT AS WELL. 
AND IF YOU LOOK, HE FORGOT TO COLOR HIS NECK IN PENCIL, SO IT'S 
A COUPLE OF SHADES LIGHTER. 
THIS IS A PERSON WHO IS FOOLISH, WHO IS THE CLASS 
CLOWN, WHO IT'S EASY TO PIN SOMETHING ON. HE WAS NOT AT THE 
SCENE. HE WAS NOT A PART OF THIS. THAT'S NOT WHAT HE DID. 
BUT AGAIN, MR. BLACK SAID IT WAS SOMEBODY NAMED REEF. HE KNOWS 
WHO THIS PERSON IS. HE COULD HAVE SAID AT HIS TRIAL IT WAS 
CHERIFF MAHI. DID HE EVER SAY AT HIS TRIAL YEAH, IT WAS 
CHERIFF MAHI, LET ME GIVE YOU HIS ADDRESS, LET ME GIVE YOU HIS 
PHONE NUMBER, LET ME SHOW YOU WHERE HE'S AT? NO. 
TODAY HE COMES IN, AFTER HIS TRIAL IS OVER, AND SAY 
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MR. MAHI WAS THERE AND NOW IDENTIFIES MR. MAHI. MR. MAHI 
WASN'T THERE. HE'S THE SCAPEGOAT. HE'S NOT ANY TYPE OF 
MASTERMIND. IF YOU LOOK AT THE LINEUP YOU KNOW THAT HE'S A 
FOOL. AND THAT'S THE PERSON THAT'S EASY TO BLAME. SOMEONE WHO 
WE KNOW THAT THESE PEOPLE ARE GOING TO RECOGNIZE, WE KNOW WHO 
IS IN THE DRUG TRADE, WHO USED DRUGS WITH HIM. THEY KNOW WHO 
HE IS. AGAIN, MR. BLACK COULD HAVE EASILY IDENTIFIED HIM AT 
HIS TRIAL, BUT HE DIDN'T. BUT THE THING IS, MAHI WASN'T THERE. 
THE EVIDENCE WILL SHOW THAT HE SIMPLY WASN'T THERE. AND WE 
WOULD ASK FOR A NOT GUILTY VERDICT BECAUSE HE WASN'T THERE. 
THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THANK YOU, MR. SIMMS. CALL 
YOUR FIRST WITNESS. 
MR. BOWN: STATE CALLS BENITO GONZALES. 
THE COURT: MS. VILLAMAR, YOU ARE MAYRA VILLAMAR, 
INTERPRETER, IS THAT CORRECT, MA'AM? 
THE INTERPRETER: YES, SIR. 
THE COURT: WOULD YOU TAKE THE OATH OF INTERPRETER, 
PLEASE? 
(WHEREUPON, THE INTERPRETER WAS SWORN IN). 
THE COURT: IF YOU WISH TO BE SEATED NEAR THE 
WITNESS, MS. VILLAMAR, PLEASE DO SO AFTER WE SWEAR MR. GONZALES 
IN. 
YOU, SIR, ARE BENITO GONZALES; IS THAT CORRECT? 
THE WITNESS: YES. 
THE COURT: AND YOU ARE HERE TO BE SWORN TO TESTIFY 
1 A NO, IT WAS NOTICEABLY DARKER FROM THE 9:30 
2 APPEARANCE, WHEN HE FIRST CAME OUT OF HIS CELL, TO LATER ON. 
3 Q DIDN'T IT BLOTCH UP IN SPACES, LIKE UNEVEN? LIKE, 
4 SAY, IF HE HAD A BLEMISH OR SOMETHING IT WOULD LIKE CONGREGATE 
5 RIGHT THERE AND IT'D BE VERY DARK IN SOME SPOTS? 
6 A I COULDN'T REMEMBER. I KNOW IN SOME PLACES IT WAS 
7 DARKER THAN OTHERS. 
8 I MR. SIMMS: OKAY. NO FURTHER QUESTIONS, JUDGE. 
9 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. DEPUTY, YOU MAY STEP DOWN, 
10 SIR. THANK YOU. YOU ARE FREE TO GO. 
11 THE STATE NOW RESTS? 
12 MR. KNELL: WE DO, YOUR HONOR. 
13 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. MEMBERS OF THE JURY, WE'LL 
14 TAKE A RECESS. REMEMBER THE ADMONITION I'VE GIVEN YOU AND THE 
15 BAILIFF WILL TELL YOU WHAT TIME TO RETURN TO THE COURTROOM. 
16 WE'LL TAKE APPROXIMATELY A 10 MINUTE RECESS. THANK YOU, FOLKS, 
17 YOU'RE FREE TO GO. 
18 (WHEREUPON, THE JURY LEAVES THE COURTROOM). 
19 THE COURT: THE JURY HAS LEFT THE COURTROOM. THE 
20 DEFENDANT, ALL COUNSEL ARE PRESENT. 
21 YOU HAVE A MOTION TO MAKE, MR. SIMMS? 
22 MR. SIMMS: I DO, YOUR HONOR. I HAVE A DIRECTED 
23 VERDICT, BUT I HAD A MOTION THAT I APPROACHED ON. AND I WOULD 
24 MOVE FOR A MISTRIAL IN THIS MATTER. I THINK THAT THE 
25 I OFFICERS — IT'S FAIR TO TALK ABOUT A LINEUP, BUT WHEN YOU TALK 
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ABOUT MR. MAHI'S CELL, AND YOU INFORM THE JURY THAT HE'S IN 
CUSTODY, I THINK THAT THAT PREJUDICES THE DEFENDANT AND 
PREJUDICES HIS ABILITY TO GET A FAIR TRIAL. I THINK THE CASE 
LAW IS CLEAR THAT YOU CAN NOT REFER TO THE DEFENDANT AS BEING 
IN CUSTODY. I THINK THAT'S WHY WE HAVE HIM DRESSED IN CIVILIAN 
CLOTHES TODAY EVEN THOUGH HE IS IN CUSTODY. 
THE CASES I THINK I MENTIONED ON THIS ISSUE ARE — 
I — 
THE COURT: LEAD YOU? 
MR. SIMMS: YES. 
THE COURT: THANK YOU. MR. KNELL, DO YOU WISH TO 
RESPOND? 
MR. KNELL: I'D LIKE TO, YOUR HONOR. I WAS CERTAINLY 
PREPARED TO DO THE MOTION IN LIMINE TO DISCUSS THAT EXACT 
ISSUE, HOWEVER, I THINK THAT WENT OUT THE WINDOW WITH THE 
DEFENDANT'S OPENING ARGUMENT WHERE THEY DISCUSSED A LINEUP AND 
THEY ACTUALLY SHOW A JAIL PICTURE. I THINK HE BROUGHT THAT 
INTO ISSUE. HE DISCUSSED THE LINEUP FIRST. I DID NOT GET INTO 
THE DEFENDANT BEING INCARCERATED, BUT I DON'T SEE HOW WE CAN 
RESPOND TO THE LINEUP ISSUES WITHOUT CALLING THE PEOPLE WHO DO 
THE LINEUPS. AND THEY HAPPEN TO BE AT THE JAIL. 
THE COURT: I'M WITH YOU. DID YOU HAVE SOMETHING 
ELSE TO SAY? 
MR. SIMMS: YES, YOUR HONOR. EVERY LINEUP, EVEN IF 
SOMEONE'S OUT OF CUSTODY, THEY PUT HIM IN THE SAME OUTFITS, THE 
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SAME JAIL OUTFIT. SO BEING IN THAT JAIL OUTFIT DOESN'T 
NECESSARILY MEAN YOU ARE IN CUSTODY. TALKING ABOUT A LINEUP 
DOESN'T NECESSARILY MEAN THAT SOMEBODY'S IN CUSTODY. I THINK 
IT'S VERY DIFFERENT WHEN YOU GO INTO TALKING ABOUT HIS 
PARTICULAR CELL, HIM BEING IN JAIL, HIM VISITING PEOPLE, HAVING 
VISITING HOURS IN JAIL. I THINK THAT WE HAVE CROSSED OVER AND 
WE HAVE SAID THAT HE IS IN CUSTODY. 
THE COURT: UM, I'M NOT SO PERSUADED, MR. SIMMS. I 
THINK IT' S ACCURATE, A FAIR DESCRIPTION TO SAY THAT THE 
DEFENSE, BY PRESENTING IN OPENING, THE EXHIBIT, WHICH IS THE 
BLOWUP OF THE DEFENDANT, AND SHOWING HIS CHANGED APPEARANCE --
AND I DON'T RECALL WHAT EXHIBIT SPECIFICALLY THAT IS. 
MR. SIMMS: 10, YOUR HONOR. 
THE COURT: EXHIBIT 10. THANK YOU. IN AN EFFORT TO 
ESTABLISH THAT, INDEED, MR. MAHI IS JUST SIMPLY A JOKESTER, 
THAT HE'S KIND OF A CLASS JESTER SO TO SPEAK, AND ALL OF THIS 
IS JUST IN GOOD FUN, AND BY PRESENTING THE BLOWUP OF HIS 
APPEARANCE AT THE JAIL, IT SEEMS TO ME ONE MIGHT REASONABLY 
INFER THAT, INDEED, HE IS IN CUSTODY AT THE TIME THIS LINEUP 
TOOK PLACE. AND THEREFORE, I THINK IT'S A FAIR ASSUMPTION TO 
CONCLUDE FROM THAT THAT THE STATE, IN AN EFFORT TO PRESENT A, 
SO TO SPEAK, GUILTY MIND, RATHER THAN SIMPLY A JOKESTER TRYING 
TO CHANGE HIS APPEARANCE, WAS WITHIN PROPER BOUNDS BY 
PRESENTING THE EVIDENCE. 
NOW, HAVING SAID THAT, IF YOU ARE CONCERNED THAT 
1 THERE HAS BEEN UNDUE PREJUDICE TO THE DEFENDANT, WHICH I DON'T 
2 BELIEVE THERE HAS, BUT IF YOU DO, THEN I WILL BE HAPPY TO 
3 PROVIDE THEM, THE JURY, WITH AN INSTRUCTION THAT THEY ARE TO, 
4 ALONG THE LINES, THAT THEY ARE TO DISREGARD THE ISSUE OF HIS 
5 CUSTODY. WE'RE SIMPLY FOCUSSING ON HIS CHANGED APPEARANCE. 
6 AND IF THEY INFERRED THAT HE MAY WELL BE IN CUSTODY THAT'S AN 
7 IRRELEVANT CONSIDERATION FOR PURPOSES OF TRIAL. IF YOU WANT ME 
8 TO GIVE THAT KIND OF INSTRUCTION I'LL DO IT. 
9 NOW, IN THE MEANTIME, THOUGH, WHILE YOU ARE THINKING 
10 THAT OVER, DO YOU WISH TO MAKE A MOTION FOR A DIRECTED VERDICT? 
11 MR. SIMMS: I DO, YOUR HONOR. WE WOULD MOVE AND 
12 STATE THAT THERE'S INSUFFICIENT EVIDENCE ON ALL THREE COUNTS 
13 AND WE WOULD SUBMIT IT ON THAT, YOUR HONOR. 
14 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THE MOTION IS DENIED. I'M 
15 PERSUADED THAT THERE'S SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE HERE TO GO TO THE 
16 JURY. NOW WE'LL ALL TAKE A RECESS. AND THEN — IS IT YOUR 
17 INTENT AT THIS POINT, OR DO YOU KNOW, WHETHER OR NOT MR. MAHI 
18 WILL TAKE THE STAND? 
19 MR. SIMMS: I WILL DISCUSS THAT WITH HIM DURING THE 
20 BREAK. 
21 THE COURT: ALL RIGHT. THEN WHEN WE RETURN, IF WE 
22 ARE INTENT THEN UPON RESTING, WE'LL RECESS AGAIN AND DO THE 
23 INSTRUCTIONS, UNLESS YOU COME AND TELL ME WHILE THE JURY IS 
24 STILL OUT. 
25 MR. SIMMS: IT IS LIKELY MR. MAHI WILL TESTIFY. 
